DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS 

 
Application for the Correction of 
the Coast Guard Record of: 
 
                                                                                        BCMR Docket No. 2008-018 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx   

FINAL DECISION 

 
 
This is a proceeding under the provisions of section 1552 of title 10 and section 425 of 
title  14  of  the  United  States  Code.    The  Chair  docketed  the  case  on  October  26,  2007,  upon 
receipt of the completed application, and assigned it to staff member J. Andrews to prepare the 
decision for the Board as required by 33 C.F.R. § 52.61(c). 
 
 
appointed members who were designated to serve as the Board in this case. 
 

This  final  decision,  dated  July  24,  2008,  is  approved  and  signed  by  the  three  duly 

APPLICANT’S REQUEST AND ALLEGATIONS 

 

 
 

 

The applicant, an aircraft commander and lieutenant commander (LCDR/O-4), asked the 
Board to remove from his personnel record a special officer evaluation report (SOER)1 for the 
period May 31, 2005, to February 2, 2006, which contains low marks of 22 for the performance 
categories “Results/Effectiveness,” “Professional Competence,” “Judgment,” and “Responsibili-
ty”; a low mark of 3 for “Initiative”; and a low mark in the second spot on the comparison scale,3 
indicating  that  the  applicant  was  a  “marginal  performer  [with]  limited  potential.”    The  SOER 
documented  the  applicant’s  removal  from  the  Navy’s  Fixed-wing  Instructor  Training  Unit 
(FITU),  which  trains  aircraft  commanders  to  become  instructor  pilots  (IPs).    The  applicant 
alleged that the SOER is erroneous and unjust because, during the evaluation period covered by 
the SOER, 

 

                                                 
1 Under Article 10.A.3.c.1.a. of the Personnel Manual, an SOER may be prepared “to document performance notably 
different  from  the  previous  reporting  period,  if  deferring  the  report  of  performance  until  the  next  regular  report 
would preclude documentation to support adequate personnel management decisions, such as selection or reassign-
ment.” 
2 Coast Guard officers are rated in numerous categories of performance on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 being best.  A 
middle mark of 4 is the “expected standard of performance.”  Personnel Manual, Art. 10.A.4.c.4.g. 
3 The comparison scale on an OER is not numbered, but there are 7 possible marks with written descriptions ranging 
from “performance unsatisfactory for grade or billet” to “BEST OFFICER of this grade.”  The OER form instructs 
the Reporting Officer to complete the comparison scale by comparing the Reported-on Officer with all of the other 
officers of the same grade whom the Reporting Officer has known throughout his career. 

•  all of his academic grades were “90% or higher”; 
•  all of his FITU flights were rated as satisfactory or better; 
• 

the executive officer (XO) of his squadron had a personal vendetta against him and 
wanted “to attrite [the applicant] from his squadron, XXX”; and 
the commanding officer (CO) of the XXX squadron,4 who never flew with the appli-
cant  and  did  not  know  him  personally,  nevertheless  labeled  him  as  unfit  to  be  an 
instructor pilot on the SOER. 

• 

 

In support of his allegations, the applicant submitted the following statement signed by 

CDR Y, who is a standardization instructor at the FITU: 

 
… I am familiar with the circumstances leading up to [the applicant’s] attrition [from the FITU].  
Additionally, having flown a syllabus event with him and spoken with other FITU instructors who 
have flown with him, I have a sense of his capabilities as an aviator. 
 
Before discussing [the applicant’s] individual circumstances, it is important to understand a little 
about the FITU.  The FITU prepares fleet aviators to become primary flight instructors in one of 3 
squadrons at NAS xxxxxxxxxxxx.  The FITU is staffed by experienced instructor pilots (IPs) from 
each  squadron.    Much  of  the  training  in  the  FITU  is  peer-to-peer;  the  IP  and  Instructor  Under 
Training (IUT) have similar rank and fleet experience.  As such, the FITU has developed a corpo-
rate  culture  of  pulling  punches  when  it  comes  to  documenting  substandard  performance.    The 
“norm” in the FITU is to call any flight in which the IUT’s performance is not up to standard a 
warm-up in lieu of a failure.  It is generally understood that some IUTs will need more flight time 
than  others  to  meet  the  same  standard of performance.  Before [the applicant’s] attrition, it had 
been over 3 years since an IUT had washed out of the FITU.  During that period, hundreds of IPs 
went  through  training.    A  review of all instructor training jackets over that period would reveal 
countless warm-ups that were not attributable to excessive time out of the cockpit.  In short, [the 
applicant’s] attrition from the FITU was extremely unusual. 
 
At first, this seems to indicate that [the applicant’s] performance was exceedingly poor.  In fact, his 
performance was simply average.  In my opinion, [he] was attrited because he was not well liked 
by his Commanding Officer.  While personality plays an important role in any professional rela-
tionship,  I  find  it  regrettable  that  [the  applicant’s]  attrition  is  being  linked  to  poor  performance 
instead of his CO’s lack of confidence in him. 
 
Within the FITU, there are a few instructors who have a reputation of being more demanding than 
others.  They expect more from the IUTs and hold them to a higher standard than most.  The first 
time [the applicant’s] performance was deemed substandard was when he flew with one of these 
instructors, [CDR X].  Unfortunately for him, his very next flight was with [CDR X], and his per-
formance had not improved.  This is a situation where “strength of an idea” probably doomed the 
flight from the start.  [The applicant] had clearly not impressed the IP on his previous flight, so it 
would be natural for [CDR X] to have low expectations on the next sortie.  It would also be under-
standable for [the applicant] to be under more stress than usual and not achieve his best perform-
ance.  The sortie played out as expected.  It is important to note that [the applicant] had already 
been successful in the NATOPS phase of training with no previous indications of substandard per-
formance. 
 

                                                 
4 XXX is a training squadron in which student pilots receive primary flight instruction from instructor pilots (IPs), 
including about 67 hours of instructional flight time in a T-34C aircraft and 21 hours in a simulator.  To serve as an 
IP, an aircraft commander must first complete training as an instructor under training (IUT) at the FITU.  Both XXX 
and the FITU are subunits of Training Air Wing Xxx, but each IUT at the FITU is permanently assigned to one of 
the training squadrons, such as XXX, where he or she may eventually work as an IP.  The squadron is headed by a 
CO and XO, whereas the FITU is headed by an Officer in Charge (OIC). 

As luck would have it, one of the next flights [the applicant] flew was with the wing Standardiza-
tion Officer, [LT X].  [LT X] is another IP with very high standards and [the applicant] failed to 
meet those standards.  At this point, the officer in charge of the FITU realized that there was a 
problem and called [the applicant] in for counseling.  After counseling, [LCDR X] developed a 
plan for remediation.  [The applicant] was to fly 2 simulator flights to get him up to standard and 
then fly a warm-up in the aircraft before reattempting the flight he had failed.  During a meeting 
with  the  staff  IPs,  [LCDR  X]  addressed  [the  applicant’s]  situation.    Several  IPs  who  had  flown 
with  [the  applicant]  commented  that  they  had  been  pleased  with  his  performance  when  he  flew 
with  them  and  did  not  think  he  was  a  below-average  IUT.    The  FITU  standardization  officer, 
[CAPT K], was assigned to monitor [the applicant’s] performance in the simulator.  I spoke with 
[CAPT K] afterwards and he commented that [the applicant] flew the simulator very well. 
 
Unfortunately, news of [the applicant’s] flights with [CDR X] had already reached the CO and XO 
of XXX, [the applicant’s] parent squadron.  It turns out that neither had much cared for [the appli-
cant’s]  attitude  when  he  checked  into  the  squadron  several  months  earlier  and  this  information 
further eroded their confidence in him.  They called the Coast Guard Liaison Officer, [CAPT L], 
and spoke with him about this lack of confidence.  [CAPT L] made some informal calls to get a 
more complete picture of [the applicant] and not everything he heard was complimentary.  When 
this information was passed to the CO and XO of XXX, they decided that they didn’t want [the 
applicant] in their squadron even if he were able to successfully complete the FITU.  As such the 
ball was set in motion to attrite [the applicant] even before he had completed the remedial training 
[LCDR  X]  had  designed.    His  remediation  was  suspended  and  the  FITU  was  directed  to  attrite 
him. 
 
The momentum to attrite [the applicant] was built within days, or possibly even hours.  By the time 
I got word from the FITU Officer in Charge, it was already too late.  [The applicant] had abso-
lutely no clue that anything was amiss when I ran into him a few days after his remedial simulator 
flights.  He indicated he had been studying hard and felt confident that he would do well on his 
next flight.  When I informed him that he was about to be attrited, he was completely shocked.  In 
other words, at no time was he led to believe that his future as an instructor and possibly as an 
aviator was in jeopardy. 
 
I do not desire to cast aspersions on the professionalism and judgment of [CDR X and LT X].  I’m 
sure their evaluations of [the applicant’s] performance are accurate.  I would only point out that the 
majority of the FITU instructors were not enforcing those same standards.  If all IUTs were held to 
[CDR X’s] high standards, the FITU would attrite instructors as a matter of routine.  At the time 
[the applicant] was attrited, there were at least 2 other IUTs whose performance was significantly 
worse, yet neither of those IUTs was targeted for attrition.  [The applicant] was an average IUT.  
He demonstrated solid performance on many flights, but didn’t do as well on others.  He should 
have been given the opportunity to demonstrate his ability to meet the prescribed standards after 
his remedial training was complete.  By failing to give him that opportunity, the leadership at XXX 
and Trawing-X treated [him] unfairly. 
 
In my 19 years of experience as a CG aviator, poor performance on a training flight or even multi-
ple  training  flights  has  never  led  to  a  derogatory  officer  evaluation  report.    Not  everyone  can 
assimilate information at the same speed.  As a result, training programs are designed to allow for 
remediation.  Even if [the applicant] had been allowed to continue remediation and subsequently 
failed to meet the required performance standard, I would not expect him to receive a derogatory 
OER. 

 

SUMMARY OF THE APPLICANT’S RECORD 

 
On  October  4,  1990,  the  applicant  enlisted  in  the  Coast  Guard  Reserve.    He  attended 
Officer Candidate School; received a Reserve commission on February 22, 1991; and completed 
Navy flight training with high scores to become a co-pilot in May 1995.  He was integrated into 

the regular Coast Guard as a lieutenant junior grade on April 7, 1995, and was promoted to lieu-
tenant August 22, 1995.  After completing on-the-job aviator training, he was upgraded to first 
pilot in 1997 and to aircraft commander in 1998.  The applicant received very good OERs while 
working  at  an  air  station  in  xxxxxxxxx  and  was  awarded  an  Achievement  Medal.    He  also 
received very good OERs at his next unit, an air station in xxxxxxxxxxx, and his annual OER in 
2003 noted that he “led pilots in productivity.”  On July 1, 2003, the applicant was promoted to 
lieutenant commander (LCDR).  On December 20, 2003, the applicant was awarded a fourth Let-
ter of Commendation for piloting a helicopter during a rescue mission when a small boat full of 
immigrants grounded in the surf.  The Letter of Commendation praises the applicant’s “precise 
hovering and superb hoisting” and states that he “immediately prepared the crew for a series of 
rescue swimmer hoists followed by multiple basket recoveries of the people in the water.  You 
kept a mental count of the victims needing hoisting and when one came up missing, you diligent-
ly  combed  the  shoreline  and  located  a  group  of  good  Samaritans  motioning  toward  another 
victim.  Your quick actions, diligent search efforts, and professionalism resulted in 19 hoists and 
eight lives saved.” 

 
On the applicant’s final OER at the air station in xxxxxx, which covered his service from 
May 1, 2004, to May 30, 2005, he received ten marks of 5, six marks of 6, and two marks of 7 in 
the various performance categories and a mark in the fifth spot on the comparison scale, which 
described  him  as  an  “excellent  performer;  give  toughest,  most  challenging  leadership 
assignments.”  His Reporting Officer stated that the applicant’s “professional expertise, sound 
judgment, and resource management skills make him an invaluable asset to the Coast Guard” and 
recommended that he be “promote[d] to Commander with the best.” 

 
On May 31, 2005, the applicant was transferred to a naval air station in xxxxxxx to attend 

FITU to become an instructor pilot.  His aviation training jacket contains the following: 

•  A record of his classes, lectures, and exams, indicating grades of 94, 93.3, 97.5, 93.3, 90, 

 

96, 94, 100, 100, and 98. 

•  A  Cockpit  Procedure  Aviation  Training  Form  (C6001)  dated  September  12,  2005, 
indicating that the applicant was well prepared for the test of his basic cockpit knowledge 
and had “good knowledge and understanding of the checklist items.”   

•  A cockpit training form (C6002) dated September 13, 2005, indicating that he performed 

all normal and emergency procedures in accordance with NATOPS and FTI.   

•  A cockpit training form (C6003) dated September 13, 2005, indicating that he executed 

all required maneuvers at or above minimum standards. 

•  A NATOPS Aviation Training Form (I6001) dated September 14, 2005, stating that the 
applicant was “a bit surprised at what it took to keep the shiny side up” during a simulator 
flight, but he “started to get the hang of it as the hop progressed.  New [aircraft], stiff 
wing vs. floppy wing and single piloted environment was an eye-opener.  Need to review 
the basic instrument [power] & attitude settings so as to have a baseline to work with, and 
study  general  NATOPS  procedures  for  instrument  approaches  &  VOR  holding.    Good 
attitude – hit the books – very receptive to instruction.”  He received a passing grade. 

•  A NATOPS training form (I6002) dated September 14, 2005, stating that the applicant 
was well prepared for a simulator flight and showed “excellent knowledge of all required 
procedures.” 

•  A NATOPS training form (C7001) dated October 18, 2005, stating “not bad for a first 

effort back in the plane” and “solid back in the saddle for IUT.” 

•  A NATOPS training form (C7003) dated October 19, 2005, stating “a real eye opener for 
[the applicant]. … All under bag and flown with the appropriate humility.  Keep up the 
good work.”  The applicant received a passing grade. 

•  A NATOPS training form (C7002) dated October 20, 2005, completed by CDR X, with 
an incomplete grade and many negative comments, such as “a very dismal flight … per-
formance today was not at an acceptable level and therefore the flight could not be com-
pleted.    Procedural  knowledge  in flight was below average!  His approach in the brief 
appeared to be very nonchalant, almost ‘flighty’—have some concerns on his credibility 
before [student naval aviators]. … minimal effort was put forth into preparations for this 
event and it was expected I would either spoon-feed him or accept a mediocre effort … 
Probably one of the worst prepared early NATOPS events I’ve flown.  Needs to get into 
the NATOPS/ FTI ASAP!  Maneuver procedures almost non-existent – claimed getting 
through the 3 C’s hampered him! … My impression is that this IUT can fly – his ability to 
perform the HAPL/LAPL indicates that – what I’m not sure of is his efforts to know the 
procedures. …”  

•  Another (C7002) NATOPS training form, dated October 21, 2005, with a passing grade 
but the comment that the applicant showed “improvement in knowledge and procedures, 
but IUT still lacks critical knowledge of preflight, systems and limits.  IUT did not know 
how to properly preflight [oxygen] mask and regulator system.” 

•  A NATOPS training form (C7004) dated October 25, 2005, with some criticisms of the 

applicant’s performance in a T-34C plane, but a passing grade. 

•  A NATOPS training form (C7005) dated October 28, 2005, indicating that the test was 

“incomplete due to IUT [the applicant] needing high spins.” 

•  Another  (C7005)  training  form,  dated  October  31,  2005,  with  some  criticisms  of  the 

applicant’s performance in a T-34C plane, but a satisfactory passing grade. 

•  A NATOPS training form (C7190) dated November 2, 2005, with some criticisms of the 

applicant’s performance in a T-34C, but a satisfactory passing grade. 

•  A Basic Instruments (BI) Aviation Training Form (I4001) dated November 7, 2005, stat-
ing that the applicant was well prepared and showed good knowledge of procedures in the 
simulator.  

•  Another BI training form (I4002) dated November 7, 2005, indicating that the applicant 

performed all maneuvers in the simulator in accordance with the training guidelines. 

•  A Radio Instruments (RI) Aviation Training Form (I4101) dated November 8, 2005, indi-

cating that the applicant completed all required items and was very well prepared. 

•  An RI training form (I4102) dated November 8, 2005, indicating that the applicant com-

pleted all maneuvers in accordance with the training guidelines. 

•  An RI training form (I4201) dated November 9, 2005, indicating that the applicant was 

well prepared, had good knowledge of GPS procedures, and passed the test. 

•  A BI training form (I5001) dated November 23, 2005, indicating that the applicant per-

formed excellently on basic instruments airwork in a T-34C and passed the test. 

•  Another BI training form (I5002) dated November 23, 2005, indicating that the applicant 

flew well and passed the test. 

•  An RI training form (I5101) dated November 29, 2005, stating that it was a good flight 

with “all SSR accomplished” and that the applicant had passed. 

•  An RI training form (I5102) dated November 29, 2005, stating that it was a good flight 

with “all SSR accomplished” and that the applicant had passed. 

•  An RI training form (I5103) dated December 12, 2005, with some criticisms of rough air-

work but a passing grade. 

•  An RI training form (I5286) dated January 9, 2006, indicating that the applicant’s per-
formance was good in the simulator but they were “unable to fly due to warmup require-
ments” because it had been more than three weeks since the applicant’s last flight. 

•  Another  (I5286)  RI  training  form,  dated  January  10,  2006,  completed  by  LT  X,  with 
many criticisms of the applicant’s performance in the T-34C, an unsatisfactory grade, and 
a “Warm Up” stamp. 

•  A  third  (I5286)  RI  training  form,  dated  January  11,  2006,  completed  by  CDR  X,  with 

many criticisms of the applicant’s procedural performance and an unsatisfactory grade. 

•  An RI training form (I4186 (I4102)) dated January 17, 2006, and stamped “Warm Up” 

with both nice and critical comments about the applicant’s performance on a simulator. 

•  Another (I4186 (I4102)) RI training form, dated January 18, 2006, and stamped “Warm 

Up” with nice and critical comments about the applicant’s performance on a simulator. 

•  A  letter  dated  January  20,  2006,  from  the  Officer  in  Charge  (OIC)  of  the FITU to the 
Commodore stating that on January 6, 2006, the applicant had been counseled about “his 
lack of standardization of NATOPS procedures, INAV FTI procedures, and his actions 
necessary to improve standardization.  It was determined that he would be provided the 
opportunity to remediate his standardization to the required level. … He will be provided 
two  supervised  simulator  events  to  improve  INAV  procedures.    This  action  was  com-
pleted on 17 and 18 JAN 2006.  In addition, he will be provided three supervised warm-
up IUT flights prior to resumption of syllabus.  In the event [he] does not show improve-
ment, he will be referred to your office and recommended for discontinuation of IUT syl-
labus. 
 
On February 2, 2006, the applicant was removed from the FITU before completing the 
training.  The disputed SOER covers his IUT training at the FITU from May 31, 2005, through 
February 2, 2006.  Most of the performance categories on the SOER are marked “not observed,” 
but the low marks of 2 for “Results/Effectiveness” and “Professional Competence” are supported 
by the following comments by the XO of the XXX squadron, who was the applicant’s Supervi-
sor:5 

 
Relieved of primary duty as a flight instructor pilot due to unsatisfactory performance in the Fixed-
wing  Instructor  Training  Unit  (FITU)  instructor  training  syllabus,  a  demonstrated  lack  of  stan-
dardization, and an attitude not conducive to instructing in a military training squadron.  Following 
a  flight  terminated  for  substandard  performance  on  October  20,  2005,  a  veteran  instructor  and 
former training squadron CO record performance as “A VERY DISMAL flight” and “one of the 
worst prepared early NATOPs events I’ve flown.”  This flight was nearly two months after starting 
the  syllabus,  which  was  ROO’s  only  assigned  duty.    ROO’s  attitude  during  this  flight  was 
described as “very nonchalant, almost ‘flighty’.”  Following this event, ROO was counseled on the 
requirement to be fully prepared for each flight and to be absolutely standard in accordance with 

                                                 
5 Each officer is evaluated by a rating chain of three superior officers, including a Supervisor, who is usually the 
person to whom the officer reports on a daily basis and who completes the first 13 performance category marks on an 
OER;  a  Reporting  Officer,  who  is  usually  the  Supervisor’s  supervisor  and  who  completes  the last 5 performance 
category marks on an OER and also the comparison scale mark; and a Reviewer, who reviews the OER for accuracy, 
consistency, and compliance with regulations.  Personnel Manual, Art. 10.A.2. 

NATOPs and Flight Training Instructions (FTI), which detail maneuver procedures.  On Jan. 10, 
2006, another flight was deemed unsatisfactory due to lack of procedural knowledge.  Given the 
same flight the very next day, performance was also graded as unsatisfactory due to “INABILITY 
TO CONFORM TO NATOPS and FTI standardization and procedures!” 
 
In block 7 of the OER, the CO of the XXX squadron, who was the applicant’s Reporting 

Officer, explained why he concurred with the XO’s comments:   

 
Because no amount of oversight on my part can cover every situation that my Instructor Pilots may 
face on a daily basis, I must have complete and unfettered trust in their ability to make good deci-
sions at all times and do the right things on each and every flight.  [The applicant’s] unsatisfactory 
performance in the FITU and cavalier attitude towards his assigned duties have made it clear that 
he has not met these demanding requirements, and I have no confidence in his ability to ever meet 
these responsibilities. 
 
The CO assigned the applicant a mark of 3 for “Initiative” and marks of 2 for “Judgment” 
and “Responsibility” in the SOER and supported these low marks with the following comments: 

 
Displayed  poor  initiative,  judgment,  and  responsibility  by  inadequately  preparing  for  instructor 
syllabus training flights.  Counseled about performance and need to adhere to standard procedures 
for Naval Training Command instructor pilots with only a marginal improvement in performance.  
ROO’s sole duty was to prepare for an complete the Fixed-wing Instructor Training syllabus, yet 
he reported for instructor training flights unprepared. 
 
The CO assigned the applicant a mark in the second spot on the comparison scale, denot-
ing  a  “marginal  performer,”  and  added  the following comments about his potential to assume 
greater leadership roles: 

 
My limited observation of [the applicant] has only proven to me that he would be a poor instructor 
pilot and that he will likely always struggle with standardization in any environment.  [He] per-
formed no other duties or responsibilities that would allow me to comment on his potential in any 
other area and, therefore, I cannot make a promotion recommendation. 
 
Because the SOER was “derogatory” under Article 10.A.4.h. of the Personnel Manual,6 
the applicant was permitted to add a written addendum before it was forwarded to the Reviewer.  
His addendum, dated March 3, 2006, states the following: 

 
This derogatory OER is based solely on 2 flights that I had with [CDR X] USN and does not take 
into account my entire training jacket.  My academic grades are 90% or better and my flight per-
formance was solid.  The only problems that I encountered were when I flew with [CDR X].  His 
evaluations are not consistent with all the other write-ups and indicate a personality conflict.  The 
following are my academic and flight grades taken directly from my Aviation Training Jacket: 

T-34C Aircraft Systems 
Aero Exam 

 

ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE 
94% 
93.3% 

09 Sep 
26 Sep  NAV Exam 

INAV (jetlog) 

96% 
94% 

12 Dec 
23 Nov 

                                                 
6  Article  10.A.4.h.  of  the  Personnel  Manual,  states  that  an  OER  is  “derogatory”  when  it  “documents  adverse 
performance or conduct that results in the removal of a member from his or her primary duty or position.”  Before 
forwarding  a  derogatory  OER  to  the  Reviewer,  the  Reporting  Officer  provides  a  copy  of  it  to  the  Reported-on 
Officer who may submit a written addendum.  The addendum is forwarded up the rating chain, and the Supervisor 
and Reporting Officer who prepared the OER are allowed to address matters raised in the addendum.  The Reporting 
Officer forwards derogatory OER to the reviewer, who may attach a comment page with a separate comparison scale. 

 

 

Emergency Procedures 
Flight Rule & Regs 
Instrument Exam 

97.5% 
93.3% 
90.0% 

04 Oct 
22 Sep 
01 Dec  VTCR Exam 

Safe for Solo 
Spin Exam 

100% 
100% 
100% 

10 Nov 
23 Sep 
03 Oct 

FLIGHT/PRACTICAL PERFORMANCE 

C6001 – Well prepared, solid flight.  C6002 – Well prepared.  C6003 – Solid flight, all maneuvers 
at or above min. standard.  I6001 – Good Attitude.  I6002 – Well prepared, excellent knowledge. 
C7001 – Solid first flight in T-34 as IUT.  C7002 – Dismal flight.  C7003 – Good work.  C7004 – 
Average flight.  C7005 – Average.  C7190 – Satisfactory Natops check.  I4001 – Well prepared.  
I4002 – Completed all maneuvers.  I5101 – Nice flight.  I5102 – Good flight.  I5103 – Average 
flight.  I5201 – Good flight, 21 day warm-up.  I5202 – Warm-up, behind aircraft I5202 – Unsatis-
factory. 

On 20 Oct. 2005, I had my second Natops “standardization” syllabus flight as an “IUT” Instructor 
Under Training with [CDR X] USN.  He was late for the brief and I waited in the ready room until 
he arrived.  Approximately one hour later he arrived and we started our brief.  Midway through the 
brief, I had to use the head so I respectfully asked if we could take a 5-minute break.  He found this 
quite comical and as I went to the head I heard him make an unprofessional comment in the pas-
sageway about how he scared the “explicative” out of that Coastie.  Right away I realized we had a 
serious personality conflict. 
 
I flew the syllabus flight and for my second flight in a T-34C in 12 years thought I did fair.  My 
procedural knowledge was a little slow, but not unsafe or blatantly disregarded.  When I tried to 
correct myself I was inundated with negative criticism.  My previous instructor spent more time 
with me on flying the maneuvers rather than briefing them over and over again.  With [CDR X], I 
felt I was being harassed and not allowed to learn in a productive manner.  After that flight I never 
wanted to fly with [CDR X] again.  I inquired with other IUTs and squadron instructor pilots and 
they all agreed that they did not like to fly with him.  I continued on my Natops phase of the train-
ing syllabi and satisfactorily passed my Natops check ride. 
 
There are approximately 58 IUTs in the “FITU” Fixed Wing Instructor Training Unit and approxi-
mately 12 “IPs” instructor pilots.  It was normal to fly only once a week and some weeks I didn’t 
fly at all due to non-availability of IPs.  On 10 Jan 2006, after 3 weeks of leave, I flew an INAV 
phase flight I5202 with [LT X].  To this point I had not flown any night familiarization flights.  
The  procedures  for  this  flight  required  that  I  talk  through  everything  including  real  ATC  radio 
calls,  simulated  radio  calls,  local  traffic  advisory  calls,  student  ATC  request  calls  and  detailed 
explanations  of  all  maneuvers  flown  including  holding,  arcing,  instrument  approaches,  etc.    We 
took off at night in hazy conditions.  As the flight progressed I became more comfortable and pro-
ficient at my required tasks.  The overall grade of the flight was satisfactory, but I failed the arcing 
departure and was hence given a warm-up. 
 
On 11 Jan. 2006 I was scheduled to fly with [CDR X].  He was late for the brief.  We briefed and 
the flight brief went well.  At this point we should have gone straight to the plane, but [he] delayed 
½ hour to have a private conversation with his friends.  I found this to be quite unprofessional.  On 
take-off, my TACAN failed which delayed some of my simulated ATC radio calls as I troubleshot 
the  TACAN  equipment.    Once  I  received  my  TACAN/DME  Distance  Measuring  Equipment,  I 
proceeded on course.  I executed and explained my required maneuvers.  As I proceeded through 
Area 2F, an area I had never been in before, I made the mistake of giving myself an unnecessary 
descent  for  practice  holding  and  a  practice  approach.    Before  I  could  correct  my  mistake,  I 
received a 20-minute lecture from [CDR X].  He inquired, “What is your purpose?”  I explained 
that this was a training flight and I was learning how to be an instructor.  He refused that comment.  
He badgered me for about 15 more minutes and then explained that my purpose was to act as look-
out.  I have flown Coast Guard and civilian aircraft for nearly 12 years and [CDR X’s] “CRM” 
cockpit resource management is the poorest I have ever experienced.  I told him I was not learning 
anything  from  him  with  his  demeaning  techniques  and  at  that  point  we  should  just  fly  back  to 
xxxxxxxxxxxxx.  He insisted on continuing the flight. 
 

I’m the first to admit I have made mistakes, but this punishment doesn’t fit the offense.  Anything I 
did that was not standard when I flew with [CDR X] was due to personality conflict, nervousness 
and being new to the training environment as an instructor.  [CAPT K] USAF flew with me 4 times 
and said I flew better than 90% of IPs.  [CDR Y] USCG told me I was not better or worse than any 
of  the  other  IUTs.    I  was  told  by  [LCDR  K],  the  FITU  OIC,  that  I  would  be  given a warm-up 
flight, that I would not be scheduled to fly with [CDR X] and that I would re-fly the INAV 5202 
syllabus flight.  I was never given that opportunity. 
 
I feel that the personality conflict I had with [CDR X] led to a “witch hunt” and that I was attrited 
unfairly  for  reasons  other  than  my  ability  to  be  an  Instructor  Pilot.    My  academics  and  overall 
flight performance are not consistent with the evaluations made by [CDR X].  I feel that this OER 
is unjustly based on my flights with [CDR X], rather than objectively including my entire training 
jacket. 
 
On March 10, 2006, the squadron XO, who served as the Supervisor for the SOER, for-

 
 
warded the applicant’s addendum with the following response for inclusion in the record: 
 

[The applicant’s] Addendum Comments center on the perceived personality conflict between him-
self and [CDR X], USN.  To be sure, [CDR X] is a knowledgeable and exacting instructor, but I 
have found him to be fair and reasonable in my frequent dealings with him.  [CDR X] once com-
manded a VT squadron, is currently the Training Wing’s second-in-command, and is regarded as a 
seasoned  veteran.    When  reviewing  training  jackets  of  instructor’s  graduating  the  Fixed-wing 
Instructor Unit (FITU), I often look to [CDR X’s] write-ups knowing he will most likely “tell it 
like it is.”  However, I had never received a call from him concerning the performance of one of 
our instructors until after he flew with [the applicant] for the first time.  He was concerned over 
[the  applicant’s]  cavalier  and  nonchalant  attitude.    [The  applicant]  admits  that  his  “laid  back” 
demeanor sometimes comes across as having a “surfer dude” personality.  Beyond the perceived 
attitude,  however,  [CDR  X]  was  deeply  concerned  about  [the  applicant’s]  lack  of  procedural 
knowledge  and  his  nonstandard  procedures.    After  counseling  [the  applicant]  on  the  need  to  be 
absolutely standard, he stated he could be the standardized instructor he needed to be.  He contin-
ued to run into trouble. 
 
[CDR X] was not the only instructor who graded [the applicant’s] performance as unsatisfactory.  
In January, after receiving a warm-up flight following leave, he flew with the Wing Standardiza-
tion Officer.  His flight was completed and graded “Unsatisfactory” for the “need to get into the 
FTI  for  procedural  details.”    Although  the  somewhat  reduced  frequency  of  FITU  flights  for 
instructors was not ideal, it was still cause for concern that after nearly five months on board, with 
his only assigned duty that of an instructor under training, he was not following some fairly basic 
procedures.  What magnified the concern still further was [his] vast flying hours and experience, 
which would normally spell success in the instructor syllabus. 
 
Following the unsatisfactory flight with the Wing Stan Officer, [the applicant] was given another 
chance to pass the flight.  His instructor was [CDR X].  [CDR X] again found his performance so 
alarmingly poor he sought us out to debrief the performance.  His main concern was [the appli-
cant’s] lack of standardization.  [LCDR X] (USCG), as the FITU OIC, proposed a training regi-
men to bring [the applicant] up to speed.  This is to be expected, since his job is to train instruc-
tors.    It  was  at  this  point,  however,  that  the  squadron and the Wing had lost confidence in [the 
applicant].  Each instructor here is absolutely entrusted to be the epitome of standardization and 
professionalism while operating in a demanding training environment, out of view of supervision.  
The future of military aviation and the safety of each day’s flight depend greatly on the profession-
alism  and  example  presented  to  Student  Naval  Aviators.    [The  applicant’s]  actions  caused  the 
squadron to doubt his ability to carry on this high calling. 

 

 
On  March  13,  2006,  the  squadron  CO,  who  served  as  the  Reporting  Officer  for  the 
SOER, forwarded the applicant’s addendum and the XO’s comments to the Reviewer along with 
his own response to the addendum: 
 

I have reviewed [the applicant’s] rebuttal to the OER that I signed on 16 Feb 2006 regarding his 
performance at the Training Wing XXX Fixed Wing Instructor Training Unit.  While his situation 
is truly unfortunate, it was substantiated by repeated instances of questionable performance in the 
aircraft.  While I cannot answer definitively as to whether or not there was some sort of personality 
conflict between [the applicant] or any other flight instructor, including [CDR X] who has signifi-
cant experience as a flight instructor, I do know that there is sufficient indication that [the appli-
cant’s] performance as a flight instructor may be in question.  As Commanding Officer, I have lost 
confidence in his ability to perform to the highest standards and safeguard the well being of the 
student aviators under the difficult conditions faced during primary flight training.  I am therefore 
left with little choice other than to deny [his] accession into the command and respectfully suggest 
his return to the Coast Guard where he may be better able to apply his aviation skills. 

 
The Reviewer of the SOER, who was the Coast Guard Liaison Officer at the naval air sta-
 
tion, attached a comment page7 on which he assigned the applicant a mark in the lowest spot on 
the  comparison  scale,  which  denotes  “performance  unsatisfactory  for  grade  or  billet.”    The 
Reviewer wrote the following comments: 
 

[The applicant’s] rating chain has been fully briefed on and they completely appreciate the Coast 
Guard  Officer  Evaluation  System  standards.    It  should  be  noted  that  while  the  applicant  was 
assigned to a Navy command, his Supervisor (XO of the Training Squadron) is a Coast Guard O-5 
[commander]. 
 
I completely concur with the Supervisor and Reporting Officer.  [The applicant’s] responsibilities 
as an Instructor-pilot Under Training (IUT) only involved studying procedures and flying his IUT 
syllabus flights.  Yet, he would not devote the time required to properly perform the required pro-
cedures.  He was given repeated counseling to improve his performance as an IUT with apparently 
little effect.  His rating chain examined the possibility that human factors might have been involved 
to explain his unsatisfactory performance, but human factors proved not to be the issue.  It is quite 
clear that [the applicant] struggles with procedural standardization and conformity.  His ability to 
operate the aircraft and manipulate the controls was never questioned.  It was the method in which 
he did so that caused so much concern.  As a Naval Flight Instructor, one must be a paragon of 
standardization for all the students they come in contact with, an example for the flight students to 
emulate.  [The applicant] presented the antithesis of this standard to those instructors charged with 
his training and certification. 
 
I am deeply troubled by the fact that an officer with [the applicant’s] seniority and aviation experi-
ence would not apply himself to satisfactorily perform such minimal responsibilities.  I completely 
agree with the Reporting Officer concerning [the applicant’s] limited potential.  While [the appli-
cant] is not recommended for promotion at this time, he may possibly improve his performance in 
a different setting where he may gain such a recommendation. 
 
It is unfortunate, but [the applicant’s] performance in this billet as a Navy Flight Instructor was 
unsatisfactory and that performance must be evaluated as such. 

 

                                                 
7  Under  Article  10.A.2.f.2.b.  of  the  Personnel  Manual,  a  Reviewer  must  add  a  comment  page  with  an  additional 
comparison  scale  mark  when  the  Reporting  Officer  for  the  OER  “is  not  a  Coast  Guard  commissioned  officer, 
member of the Coast Guard Senior Executive Service (SES), or a USPHS flag officer serving with the Coast Guard.” 
 

 
Following  his  removal  from  the  FITU,  the  applicant  was  assigned  to  an  air  station  in 
xxxxxxxx.  On his regular OER for the period February 3, 2006, through April 30, 2007, the 
applicant received one mark of 4 (for “Writing”), eight marks of 5, and nine marks of 6 in the 
various performance categories; a mark in the fourth spot on the comparison scale, which denotes 
a  “good  performer;  give  tough,  challenging  assignments”;  and  his  Reporting  Officer’s 
recommendation that he be promoted to commander (CDR/O-5). 
 

VIEWS OF THE COAST GUARD 

 

 
 
On March 12, 2008, the Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the Coast Guard submitted an 
advisory opinion adopting the findings and analysis provided in a memorandum on the case pre-
pared by the Coast Guard Personnel Command (CGPC), which recommended that the applicant’s 
request be denied.   
 

CGPC stated that during the period covered by the disputed SOER, the applicant “was 
assigned as a T-34 Aircraft Commander and designated Instructor Pilot in Primary Flight Train-
ing Squadron X (XXX).”  CGPC noted that the applicant did not apply to the Personnel Records 
Review Board for correction of the SOER.  CGPC submitted affidavits about the SOER and the 
applicant’s performance from the Supervisor and Reporting Officer (see below) and stated that 
the Reviewer is no longer available but that his views may be determined from the comment page 
that he attached to the SOER. 

 
CGPC  stated  that,  while the applicant may have received high academic grades on his 
written tests, but such scores do not establish that the SOER is erroneous.  CGPC stated that the 
SOER is “a snapshot of all performance and the rating chain is not required to limit itself to aca-
demic  performance.”    CGPC  stated  that  although  the  applicant  claimed  that  all  of  his  FITU 
flights were satisfactory or better, his flight jacket, which the applicant himself provided, contra-
dicts  this  claim  in  that  on  October  20,  2005,  CDR  X  wrote  that  the applicant’s “performance 
today was not at an acceptable level and therefore the flight could not be completed.” 

 
CGPC stated that the applicant presented nothing to support his claim that the XO had a 
personal vendetta against him, and that the XO has denied having such a vendetta.  CGPC stated 
that the applicant has also submitted no evidence to support his claim in the SOER addendum 
that he had a personality conflict with CDR X. 

 
CGPC  stated  that  the  applicant’s  rating  chain  properly  carried  out  its  responsibilities 
under the Personnel Manual and that they were in “the best position to observe the applicant’s 
performance and provide a fair, accurate, and objective [S]OER.”  CGPC argued that the appli-
cant “has not provided evidence that overcomes the presumption of regularity with respect to the 
construction or submission of the disputed [S]OER.” 

Declaration of the Applicant’s Supervisor, XO of the XXX Squadron 
 

The XO of the squadron stated that officers assigned to the FITU “are fully engaged in 
instructor  training  with  no  squadron  duty  assignments  or  obligations  other  than  an  occasional 
training  day  or  meeting,  so  my  contact  with him was quite limited.  Overall, I think that [the 
applicant] is a nice person and he did fly with two very thorough instructors when he encountered 

 
Regarding the applicant’s claim that his FITU flights were all satisfactory or better, the 
XO concurred with CDR Y’s statement that at the FITU it was “the ‘norm’ to document unsatis-
factory  events  as  something  else,”  such  as  reporting  an  unsatisfactory  flight  as  a  “warm-up.”  
However,  the  applicant’s  first  flight  with  CDR  X  “was  terminated  because  his  ‘performance 
today was not at an acceptable level and therefore the flight could not be completed.’”  The XO 
stated that CDR X recorded the flight as incomplete even though it was terminated early because 
of unsatisfactory performance.  LT X graded the applicant’s flight on January 10, 2006, as unsat-
isfactory, but “also stamped [it] as a ‘warm-up’ even though [the applicant] had just received a 
warm-up the day prior.  To the best of my knowledge, [IUTs] were not ‘owed’ more than one 
warm-up.”    The  XO  also  noted  that  the  reported  reason  for  the  warm-up  was  the  applicant’s 
“need to get into FTI procedural details” and claimed that “[w]hile airwork may grow rusty from 
a  layoff,  procedural  knowledge  should  not.”    The  XO  further  noted  that  the  applicant’s  final 
flight with CDR X was clearly graded unsatisfactory. 

 
Regarding the applicant’s claim that the XO had a “personal vendetta” against him, the 
XO strongly denied ever having a personal grudge against the applicant and claimed that they 
“had crossed paths several times in the past and were on good terms.”  The XO noted that ini-
tially the applicant called him by his first name and the XO reminded him to call him “XO,” but 
the applicant readily complied.  The XO stated that the only negative interaction they had prior to 
the applicant’s attrition from the FITU was in 2000 when the applicant committed a  

his performance failures, but in the end he was unable to earn the confidence of the Squadron or 
the Wing to instruct student naval aviators.”  

 
Regarding the applicant’s claim that the SOER is erroneous because all of his grades on 
written tests were 90% or higher, the XO noted that on a score lower than 80% was a failing 
grade and that because of the accompanying study guides, “averages of 98% were not uncom-
mon” on these tests.  The applicant’s scores, although above 90%, were average to below average 
among IUTs. 

 
fairly large procedural error … on a takeoff check during a [standardization] visit flight check with 
me …, which at the time I chalked up to the recent implementation of the challenge-and-response 
checklist.  In fact, I don’t believe I even recorded the miscue and didn’t recall it until [the appli-
cant] brought it up in conversation while in XXX.  I was somewhat aware of his fleet reputation as 
being fairly “laid back” but I did not mention anything to the squadron CO other than “he’s a good 
stick” prior to [the applicant’s] arrival.  And I did not mention anything to the Wing’s Chief Staff 
Officer, [CDR X].  Before his departure, [the applicant] did mention a comment I made during an 
initial conversation with him and another Coast Guard [IUT] which he thought was indicative of 
possible ill will toward him.  I told the other new Coast Guard [IUT] present, who was an OSC 
candidate on a 378’ deployment I was on many years earlier, that I was disappointed he was no 
longer slated to come to XXX.  [The applicant] took this as an insinuation that I would have pre-
ferred to have the other [IUT] vice him but the facts were XXX received two Coast Guard [IUTs] 
that  summer.    I  apologized  to  [the  applicant]  for  the  misunderstanding  when  he  mentioned  his 
feelings; [the comment to the other IUT] was not aimed at him in any way.  Finally, in my position 
as XO during his questioned performance, it was not a decision for me to make.  My part in the 
special OER was mainly documenting quotes from flight writeups and the CO and [the Reviewer] 
had the remainder of the comments.  It boiled down to whether I was willing to go to bat to con-
vince the CO and Wing Chief Staff Officer [CDR X] to keep [the applicant].  Given his unsatis-
factory performance in the areas of standardization and procedures despite having an abundance of 
time to apply himself to improve, I could not justify going to bat for someone in whom my confi-
dence was shaken.  The thought of having a senior instructor in the squadron who was prone to cut 

corners  in  the  cockpit  seemed  too  much  of  a  threat  to  the  proper  professional  mentoring  of  the 
young, moldable future leaders and flyers of tomorrow. 
 
Regarding  the  applicant’s  complaint  that  the  CO  removed  him  from  the  FITU  without 
actually flying with him, the XO stated that “a senior leader can make such a determination with-
out physically flying with a pilot.  A District Commander does not sail with a cutter CO before 
deciding whether to relieve him for cause.  In this case, [CDR X] the second in command at the 
Wing level, a former VT squadron CO and among the most experienced of instructors gave us 
his unsolicited and unprecedented feedback; we had no reason to doubt him.”  The XO further 
alleged that before making the decision to remove him from the FITU, the Training Wing XXX 
Commodore asked the applicant to describe himself, and the applicant responded that he was a 
“cowboy,”  which  in  the  military  denotes  a  rebel,  and  this  response  “certainly  convinced  the 
Commodore that [the applicant] should not instruct in Training Air Wing XXX.”  The XO also 
stated that the applicant’s “demeanor hurt his cause” and left the squadron CO with a negative 
impression of his professionalism and motivation. 

 
The XO stated that CDR Y’s statement on behalf of the applicant “paints a good picture 
of the FITU environment.  Times were, however, changing.”  He noted that a series of recent 
mishaps had been blamed on instructor pilots not following procedures and that a fatal mishap in 
May 2005 “precipitated a change in instructor training mentality.  Deviations from the standard 
were not tolerated.  Even prior to the string of mishaps, I believe the Navy placed more emphasis 
than the Coast Guard on standardization.  So [the applicant’s] lack of standardization was seen as 
particularly alarming and the days of the automatic ‘warm-up’ stamp were coming to a close.”  
The XO noted that shortly after the applicant’s transfer, another IUT was not allowed to continue 
training.  Previously, the XO stated, IUTs having trouble in fixed-wing training were transferred 
to train as helicopter IPs, “but it was decided quickly that to send someone to helicopters because 
he  or  she  is  having  standardization  and  procedural  issues  in  fixed-wing  is  not  an  appropriate 
strategy.”  The XO stated that the applicant probably could have succeeded at the FITU if he had 
been given extra instruction and flights but “it was the command’s sense that he would not be 
able  to  retain  an  acceptable  level  of  procedural  knowledge,  standardization,  or  motivation  to 
instruct while in the demanding role as a squadron instructor with multiple flights per day and 
collateral duties and virtually no in-flight supervision.”   

 
The XO stated that the applicant was progressing very slowly for someone with “a large 
amount of recent flight experience.”  Such slow progress is “not ideal in terms of airwork, [but] it 
does allow for ample preparation and study.”  The XO noted that the applicant’s flight training 
jacket shows that he stopped filling out his daily tracker after the first five weeks even though it 
was required.  The XO alleged that it “is one thing to be a bit under-prepared when you are flying 
daily and going through the syllabus quickly, but when you have days on end with no other obli-
gation than to prepare for a single flight, it is difficult to understand a veteran aviator not being 
prepared.”    The  XO  concluded  that  the  applicant’s  removal  from  the  FITU  was  justified,  and 
noted that it was not until after the decision was made that the rating chain was informed that 
they would have to prepare an SOER to document his removal from his primary duty. 
 

Declaration of the Applicant’s Reporting Officer, the CO of the Squadron 

 
The CO stated that at the FITU, the applicant “quickly earned a reputation and demon-
strated performance that led me to question his capacity as a military flight instructor” but also 
stated that the decision to remove the applicant was “far from hastily made.”  The CO stated that 
he became concerned about the applicant during their one-on-one in-brief on the day the appli-
cant arrived at the FITU.  The applicant had indicated that his family was living in South Amer-
ica, that he was focused on personally building his own house in Puerto Rico, and that he would 
live in the barracks while at the FITU.  This information made the CO wonder if the applicant’s 
family was falling apart and if he was having financial problems, which caused the CO to fear 
that the applicant would be distracted from his mission.  The CO was also struck by the appli-
cant’s unusually “casual, laid-back attitude.”  Thereafter, the CO was “alerted to some possible 
problems with [the applicant’s] attention to detail, particularly related to his procedural knowl-
edge and execution,” which caused concern because the applicant’s attitude was also reported to 
be  “almost  cavalier.”    Several  senior  IPs  reported  that  the  applicant  was  often  seen  “hanging 
around”  in  a  white  t-shirt  and  was  heard  calling  the  XO  by  name,  which  made  them  “a  bit 
uncomfortable,  especially  given  the  example  set  for  the  student  aviators.”    The  XO  therefore 
informally counseled the applicant about his behavior.  The CO stated that the applicant’s “laid-
back” attitude would not have been a problem “were it not manifest in his performance in the air-
craft.  However, it apparently did impact his performance such as weak to no systems knowledge 
on several briefs (and yes, even the really old guys like me at least know their systems in the 
brief, just as we expect our students to know them—cold), and, most importantly, questionable 
procedural lapses on several flights.” 

 
The CO stated that he himself was responsible for every aspect of the squadron, including 
the members’ welfare and every aircraft and crew.  He stated that his command earned three top 
squadron awards during his tenure, which is a result of “constant—constant—situational aware-
ness of the ‘complete picture’ within the command.  What is commonly referred to as ‘command 
climate’ starts at the top.  If the top accepts substandard performance, then substandard perform-
ance is delivered, which eventually can lead to certain injury or death in aviation.  Every member 
in my command … was well aware that I was simply not willing to compromise the safety of any 
member of my command for substandard performance.” 

 
Regarding the applicant’s claim that the XO had a “personal vendetta” against him, the 
CO stated that the claim was false and that the XO was “objective, level-headed, and my most 
trusted confidant in all issues.”  The CO stated that the applicant’s attitude and performance in 
flight caused him “to lose confidence in [the applicant’s] ability to perform to the highest stan-
dards and safeguard the well-being of student aviators under the difficult conditions faced during 
primary flight training.  In the end, amidst all the accusations of personality conflicts and false 
vendettas, the decision to remove [the applicant] was mine.  Although I feel personally sorry for 
[him], I stand firmly behind this important decision.” 
 

APPLICANT’S RESPONSE TO THE COAST GUARD’S VIEWS 

On March 13, 2008, the Chair sent the applicant a copy of the views of the Coast Guard 

 
 
and invited him to respond within thirty days.  No response was received.   
 

APPLICABLE REGULATIONS 

 
 
Under Article 10.A.3.a. of the Personnel Manual, lieutenant commanders usually receive 
a regular, annual OER at the end of April each year.  However, under Article 10.A.3.c.1.a., a 
special OER “may be completed to document performance notably different from the previous 
reporting period, if deferring the report of performance until the next regular report would pre-
clude documentation to support adequate personnel management decisions, such as selection or 
reassignment.” 
 

Article 10.A.4.c.4. of the Personnel Manual provides the following instructions for Super-
visors completing their section of an OER (similar instructions are provided for Reporting Offi-
cers in Article 10.A.4.c.7.): 
 

b.  For  each  evaluation  area,  the  Supervisor  shall  review  the  Reported-on  Officer’s  performance 
and qualities observed and noted during the reporting period. Then, for each of the performance 
dimensions, the Supervisor shall carefully read the standards and compare the Reported-on Offi-
cer’s  performance  to  the  level  of  performance  described  by  the  standards.  The  Supervisor  shall 
take care to compare the officer’s performance and qualities against the standards—not to other 
officers and not to the same officer in a previous reporting period. After determining which block 
best describes the Reported-on Officer’s performance and qualities during the marking period, the 
Supervisor fills in the appropriate circle on the form in ink. 
 
c.  Where  the  Supervisor  has  insufficient  information  to  provide  a  mark  or  if  observations  are 
believed inadequate to render a judgment, the “not observed” circle shall be used. The reason for 
the “not observed” must be briefly stated in the “comments” blocks or Section 2. 
 
d. In the “comments” block following each evaluation area, the Supervisor shall include comments 
citing specific aspects of the Reported-on Officer’s performance and behavior for each mark that 
deviates from a four. The Supervisor shall draw on his or her observations, those of any secondary 
Supervisors, and other information accumulated during the reporting period. 
 
e. Comments should amplify and be consistent with the numerical evaluations. They should iden-
tify specific strengths and weaknesses in performance. Comments must be sufficiently specific to 
paint a succinct picture of the officer’s performance and qualities which compares reasonably with 
the picture defined by the standards marked on the performance dimensions in the evaluation area. 
Mere repetition or paraphrasing of the standards is not sufficient narrative justification for below 
or above standard marks. 

g. A mark of four represents the expected standard of performance. Additional specific perform-
ance  observations  must  be  included  when  an  officer  has  been  assigned  a  mark  of  five  or six to 
show how they exceeded this high level of performance. Those assigned the superlative mark of 
seven should have specific comments demonstrating how they exceeded the six standard block. 

●  ●  ● 

 

Article 10.A.4.c.8.a. states that on the comparison scale in an OER, a Reporting Officer 
“shall fill in the circle that most closely reflects the Reporting Officer’s ranking of the Reported-
on Officer relative to all other officers of the same grade the Reporting Officer has known.” 

 
Under  Article  10.A.4.h.1.  of  the  Personnel  Manual,  any  OER that documents “adverse 
performance or conduct that results in the removal of a member from his or her primary duty or 
position” is a “derogatory” OER and the reported-on officer may respond to the marks and com-
ments of the Supervisor and Reporting Officer in an addendum before the OER is passed to the 

Reviewer.      Article  10.A.4.h.2.e.  allows  the  Supervisor  and  Reporting  Officer  to  add  written 
responses to the addendum before forwarding it to the Reviewer. 
 
 
Article 10.A.4.c.11.g. requires the Reviewer to add a comment page with a separate com-
parison scale mark “if the Reporting Officer is not a Coast Guard Officer, Coast Guard Senior 
Executive Service (SES) member, or the USPHS flag officer serving as Chief, Office of Health 
and Safety, Commandant (G-WK).” 

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 

 

The Board makes the following findings and conclusions based on the applicant's military 

 
 
record and submissions, the Coast Guard's submissions, and applicable law: 
 

The Board has jurisdiction concerning this matter pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1552.  

1. 

2. 

The application was timely. 
 
 
The  applicant  alleged  that  the  special  OER  (SOER)  he  received  following  his 
removal from the FITU is erroneous and unfair because his academic grades were high, his train-
ing flights were satisfactory or better, and his Supervisor, the XO of the training squadron, had a 
personal  vendetta  against  him.    He  also  argued  that  the  SOER  should  be  removed  because  it 
documents the unjust decision of the CO to remove him from the FITU even though the CO had 
never flown with him and did not know him well.  Article 10.A.1.b.1. of the Personnel Manual 
provides that “[c]ommanding officers must ensure accurate, fair, and objective evaluations are 
provided to all officers under their command.”  To establish that an OER is inaccurate or unjust, 
an applicant must prove that it was adversely affected by (a) a “misstatement of significant hard 
fact,” (b) a “clear and prejudicial violation of a statute or regulation,” or (c) factors that “had no 
business being in the rating process.”8  The Board begins its analysis in every case by presuming 
that a disputed OER is correct as it appears in the record, and the applicant bears the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it is erroneous or unjust.9  Absent evidence to 
the contrary, the Board presumes that the applicant’s Supervisor and Reporting Officer prepared 
the SOER “correctly, lawfully, and in good faith.”10 
 
 
With  respect  to  the  CO’s  decision  to  remove  the  applicant  from  the  FITU,  the 
Board finds that the applicant has submitted insufficient evidence to prove that the CO failed to 
use his best professional judgment or to act fairly and properly in removing the applicant.  The 
record indicates that the CO’s decision was based both on the applicant’s performance during 
training flights, as reported by some of the IPs at the FITU, and on his perceived attitude toward 
standardization.  The SOER explains that even though the applicant was a highly experienced 
pilot  who  had  many  weeks  to  learn  or  relearn  standard  procedures  in  the  T-34C,  he  “demon-
strated lack of standardization, and an attitude not conducive to instructing in a military training 
squadron.”  The Reviewer explained on his comment page in the SOER that, to become an IP, an 
IUT must be not only a good pilot but “a paragon of standardization for all students they come in 
                                                 
8 Germano v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1446, 1460 (1992); see also Hary v. United States, 618 F.2d 704, 708 Cl. 
1980); CGBCMR Dkt. No. 86-96. 
9 33 C.F.R. § 52.24(b). 
10 Arens v. United States, 969 F.2d 1034, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Sanders v. United States, 594 F.2d 804, 813 (Ct. Cl. 
1979). 

3. 

4. 

6. 

5. 

contact with, an example for the flight students to emulate.  [The applicant] presented the anti-
thesis  of this standard.”  The declarations of the XO and the CO indicate that  modeling stan-
dardization is a critical safety issue in training new pilots.  They also indicate that they and the 
Commodore of Training Air Wing Xxx spoke with the applicant and had an opportunity to gauge 
his attitude toward standardization but that the applicant failed to inspire their confidence in his 
ability and/or willingness to model standardization when training student pilots if he became an 
IP.   
 
 
The  applicant  alleged  that  the  CO  removed  him  from  the  FITU  and  wrote  the 
SOER without ever flying with him, but COs are allowed to make significant decisions based 
upon the reports of trusted officers.11  The record indicates that the CO based his decision both 
on  his  own  assessment  of  the  applicant’s  attitude  and  on  the  reports  of  trusted  officers.    The 
applicant  alleged  that  his  good  academic  grades disprove the allegations about his inability to 
demonstrate standardization in flight, but academic performance is not always an accurate indi-
cator of performance in the field (or air).  He alleged that all of his FITU flights were rated satis-
factory or better, but this allegation is not supported by the documents in his flight jacket.   
 
 
In  his  addendum  to  the  SOER,  the  applicant  alleged  that  his  removal  from  the 
FITU resulted from a “personality conflict” with one of the instructors, CDR X.  However, the 
XO stated that CDR X was “fair and reasonable” and an experienced IP who could be counted on 
to “tell it like it is.”  CDR Y noted that CDR X held IUTs to a high standard but also stated that 
he believes that CDR X’s evaluation was accurate.  The Board notes that the applicant failed to 
pass the I5286 test flight with LT X before he failed it with CDR X.  Therefore, the Board is not 
persuaded  that  the  applicant’s  alleged  personality  conflict  with  CDR  X  caused  him  to  be 
removed from the FITU.  In his application to the Board, the applicant  also alleged that the CO’s 
decision to remove his from the FITU was influenced by the XO, who had a “personal vendetta” 
against him.  However, the applicant provided no grounds for or evidence of the alleged vendetta, 
and the allegation is strongly denied by both the XO and the CO.  The Board concludes that the 
applicant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his removal from the FITU 
and the resulting SOER resulted from any personality conflict, vendetta, or other sort of bias. 
 
 
The  applicant  alleged  that  his  performance  in  standardization  was  average  or 
above average for an IUT but that the CO’s decision was overly influenced by one particular IP, 
CDR X, with whom the applicant had a personality conflict.  CDR Y, an IP who wrote on behalf 
of the applicant, stated that CDR X and LT X were two of the more demanding IPs and held 
IUTs to a higher standard than did other IPs, who had created a “culture of pulling punches when 
it [came] to documenting substandard performance.”  CDR Y stated that he is sure that CDR Y’s 
and LT X’s evaluations were accurate.  He speculated, however, that because the applicant did 
not perform well on his first flight with CDR X, his “very next flight,” which was also with CDR 
X, was likely “doomed … from the start” because CDR X would have had low expectations and 
the  applicant  would  have  felt  stressed.    However,  the  training  forms  in  the  applicant’s  flight 
jacket indicate that his first flight with CDR X, which was rated “dismal,” occurred on October 
20, 2005, and he did not fly again with CDR X as the IP until January 11, 2006.  The applicant’s 
performance on January 11, 2006, was unsatisfactory even though it was the third I5286 training 
form in his record.  His flight jacket contains seventeen training forms dated between his first and 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Article 10.A.2.e.2.a. of the Personnel Manual. 

 

second test flights with CDR X.  He received passing grades on all of the seventeen tests that he 
completed except the last—his second I5286 form—which was conducted by LT X on January 
10,  2006,  and  stamped  “Warm  Up.”    With  respect  to  the  applicant’s  performance  in  January 
2006, CDR Y alleged that it was common for IPs to award “warm-ups” in lieu of failing grades, 
but the XO stated that IUTs “were not ‘owed’ more than one warm-up.” 
 
 
CDR Y stated that the applicant’s performance was “simply average,” that most 
FITU IP’s “pull[ed] punches when … documenting substandard performance” by rating unsatis-
factory flights as “warm ups,” and that it is “regrettable that [the applicant’s] attrition is being 
linked to poor performance instead of his CO’s lack of confidence in him.”  CDR Y stated that 
the performance of two other IUTs was worse than that of the applicant and that the applicant 
should have been allowed to complete the remedial program proposed by the OIC of the FITU.  
The record indicates that on January 20, 2006, after the applicant had failed the I5286 flight with 
both LT X and CDR X, the OIC proposed a remedial program of two simulator and three warm-
up flights for the applicant before having him resume the usual FITU syllabus.  The OIC told the 
Commodore that if the applicant did not improve, the OIC would recommend that he not con-
tinue the IUT syllabus.  However, before the remedial program was completed, the applicant’s 
CO, having been informed of the applicant’s unsatisfactory performance, decided to remove him 
from the FITU not only because of his performance but because of his perceived attitude toward 
standardization.  The record indicates that the applicant’s attitude toward standardization was of 
significant concern not only to the CO, but to the Commodore, the squadron XO, and CDR X.  
As explained by the XO, the applicant was already a highly experienced pilot and his only duty 
while assigned to the FITU was to study and demonstrate standard procedures, which he failed to 
do  despite having many weeks to study and prepare himself.  Although the applicant was not 
permitted to complete the remedial training program proposed by the OIC of the FITU and both 
the XO and CDR Y believe that the applicant could have demonstrated standardization if given 
more time, the Board finds that the applicant has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the CO’s decision to remove him from the FITU was erroneous or unjust.   
 
The applicant argued that his removal from the FITU should not have been docu-
 
mented in a “derogatory” evaluation.  CDR Y stated that in his 19 years of experience, “poor 
performance on a training flight or even multiple training flights has never led to a derogatory 
officer evaluation report.”  However, Article 10.A.3.c.1.a. of the Personnel Manual states that a 
special OER “may be completed to document performance notably different from the previous 
reporting period, if deferring the report of performance until the next regular report would pre-
clude documentation to support adequate personnel management decisions, such as selection or 
reassignment.”  (Emphasis added.)  Under Article 10.A.4.h.1., any OER that documents “adverse 
performance or conduct that results in the removal of a member from his or her primary duty or 
position”  is  a  “derogatory”  OER.    Therefore,  although  the  Personnel  Manual  appears  not  to 
require documentation of an officer’s removal from his primary duty in an SOER under these cir-
cumstances,12 it certainly allows it and provides special procedures for it.  The record indicates 
                                                 
12  Article 4.F.6.5. of the Personnel Manual requires the preparation of an OER when a CO or an OIC is “removed 
for  cause,”  and  Article  6.A.1.  requires  the  preparation  of  an  OER  when  an  officer’s  flight  status  is  removed.  
However, the applicant was not a CO or an OIC and his flight status was not removed when he was removed from 
the  FITU.    Articles  4.E.4.,  4.E.5.,  and  4.E.6.  of  the  Personnel  Manual  require  evaluation  reports  to  be  prepared 
whenever enlisted members assigned to special duty billets, such as instructor training, are removed from their billets 
because of performance or attitude problems, but the applicant in this case is an officer. 

7. 

8. 

that the applicant’s rating chain found fault not only with the applicant’s performance during his 
training flights but also with his attitude and level of effort as an IUT, and the applicant has sub-
mitted insufficient evidence to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they were wrong in 
their assessment of his attitude and level of effort.  Therefore, the Board is not persuaded that the 
decision of the applicant’s chain of command to document his removal from his primary duty 
with a derogatory SOER is erroneous or unjust. 
 
The low marks and adverse comments in the SOER are documented in the Sum-
 
mary of the Record above.  The applicant argued that his academic grades prove that the SOER is 
inaccurate and unfair, but as stated above, academic grades are not always an accurate indicator 
of actual performance.  CDR Y stated that, contrary to the comments in the SOER, the applicant 
was removed because the CO lacked confidence in him, not because of unsatisfactory perform-
ance.  However, the record clearly shows that both the applicant’s unsatisfactory performances 
during some test flights and his failure to inspire his chain of command with confidence in his 
commitment to learning, demonstrating, and modeling standardization as an IUT and potential IP 
caused the CO to remove him from the FITU.   
 
 
The applicant has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that that any of 
the numerical marks or comments in the SOER are erroneous or unfair or that the Coast Guard 
committed  any  procedural  error  in  preparing  the  SOER.    The  SOER  was  prepared  upon  his 
removal  from  his  primary  duty  in  accordance  with  the  regulations  for  special  and  derogatory 
OERs in Articles 10.A.3.c.1.a. and 10.A.4.h.1.c. of the Personnel Manual.  The applicant has not 
proved that the SOER violates any statute or regulation.  Nor has he proved that the SOER was 
the product of a “personality conflict” with CDR X, as he argued in his addendum to the SOER, 
or of a “personal vendetta” by the XO, as he argued in his application.  Therefore, the Board con-
cludes that he has not proved that the SOER was adversely affected by (a) a “misstatement of 
significant hard fact,” (b) a “clear and prejudicial violation of a statute or regulation,” or (c) fac-
tors that “had no business being in the rating process.”13   
 
 
 
 
 

Accordingly, the applicant’s request should be denied. 

9. 

10. 

  

[ORDER AND SIGNATURES APPEAR ON NEXT PAGE] 

 

                                                                                                                                                             
 
13 Germano,at 1460; see also Hary,at 708. 

The application of xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, USCG, for correction of 

ORDER 

 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 

 
 Francis H. Esposito 

 

 

 
 
 Paul B. Oman 

 

 
 David A. Trissell 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
 

his military record is denied.